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BOOK REVIEWS
examination of what judges say in their case decisions. The jury too is centuries
old as a device for bringing public attitudes and understanding into the court-
room process; juries continue to decide so many cases and influence the settle-
ments of so many more that juror opinions too are a central part of our legal
system. But actual jury verdicts leave the jurors' reasons hidden, except where
judges, lawyers or reporters interview them; these interviews are often hurried
and inadequate, and many judges discourage or forbid them. A continuing pro-
gram of experimental jury deliberations, sponsored by the courts and covering a
wide range of legal topics, would permit us to examine what jurors say in arriv-
ing at their case decisions. This would make available to the law the wisdom or
foolishness of the jury so that reasonable instructions and trial procedures could
be developed, and it would make available to the judicial and political law-
makers the operating "sense of justice" of the public on major legal issues. The
deliberations of experimental juries who have been exposed to concrete cases
and argument on both sides can provide a much more valuable and thoughtful
form of public opinion data on legal issues than the normal public opinion polls.
The Simon study is a prototype for such ventures.
ALLEN H. BARTON
Director
Bureau of Applied Social Research
Columbia University
HONESTY AND COMPETITION: FALSE-ADVEpRTISING LAW AND POLICY UNDER
FTC ADMNISTRATION. By George J. Alexander. Syracuse: Syracuse Uni-
versity Press, 1967. Pp. 315. $10.
This excellent book packs into several hundred pages a summary of the
precedents and problems to which the Federal Trade Commission has given
birth since it first won clear authority to stop false or misleading advertising
practices.' An additional reason why it will be well worth its space on the desk of
any attorney who counsels those who market goods across state lines is that
George J. Alexander, professor and associate dean at Syracuse University College
of Law, has avoided three of the most damaging pitfalls facing the scholar who
adds to the law books in print.
The first pitfall lies in the mounting tendency of the scholar to combine a
string of theoretical generalizations without explaining them by examples or
hypothetical instances. The result, quite frequently, is a failure of communica-
tion for which any judge or client would be justifiably upbraided. Dean
I. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 US. 421, 428 (1920) where complaint of tie-in sales of jute
bagging with baling wire for cotton was held not proven an unfair method of competition,
inter alia, because no proof of deception or misrepresentation was produced by the Com-
mission. See also G.J. Alexander, Honesty and Competition 1-6 (1967) (thumbnail sketch of
the sources of Commission jurisdiction).
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Alexander's text is notable for its ability to extract the theoretical rules under
which the FTC's policing of advertising operates while making both the mean-
ing and the dimension of each rule intelligible through illustration.
An excellent example lies in his analysis of the role of "substitutive asser-
tions" in depicting some present policies underlying FTC action in the product
naming area. To show the line beyond which cease-and-desist orders will be
requested, Alexander contrasts the permissiveness with which the FTC has
allowed the use of statements like "27 percent smoother," with its crackdown
on uses of "comparable" products in a label to identify what is actually marketed
as a substitute for that product, as in "antelope suede" for skins or "alligator
calf" for shoe leather.2 Dean Alexander suggests the difference between the two
cases is that the vague claim something is "27 percent smoother" may really
be aimed at suggesting a company's product is somewhat different in kind from
other products rather than that it is substitutable. Here the practical value of
Dean Alexander's theoretical work is revealed, for if in a border-line case
attorneys can stress to the FTC the primacy of this product-differentiation func-
tion, its policy of permissiveness may govern.
The second pitfall lies in the obverse tendency of thick compendia to
present practicing attorneys with even the smallest bush in the forest without
any overview of how they fit into the theoretical forest as a whole. In the case
of the "Unfair Competition Woods" in which the false advertising trees lie, it
is often far less useful to an attorney arguing for a change in FTC policy to
know just what the FTC and the courts have done, than it is to understand
the dilemmas of conflicting policies upon which the FTC must be so often im-
paled in this area. Here Honesty and Competition is at its best, for there is
practically not a single page on which oft-ignored policy implications are not
searchingly brought to bear, whether it be on calling a thinner-sliced loaf
"light-diet bread" and similar problems of describing a product's assets in
terms of the consumer's economic demands,3 or on trying to describe a suitcase
as lower priced than similar goods and similar problems of introducing asser-
tions about competitive price advantage into the consumer's purchasing de-
cision.4
The third pitfall lies in the persistent belief among writers of law books
that decisional precedent is the only relevant source of guidance as to what the
courts will do with a client's claim. The fault can be readily seen to lie, not in
the parochialism of the local bar, but plainly in our own law teaching. Every
time a class hour goes by when the only things discussed about a case are the
legal arguments raised we are teaching that arguments based upon the knowl-
edge of other disciplines is irrelevant. In particular, every time an unfair com-
2. See G.J. Alexander, supra note 1, at 50-51.
3. Id. at 112-15, discussing Matter of National Bakers Services, Inc., [1961-1963]
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16,375 (FTC 1963).
4. Id. at 135-36, discussing Matter of Arnold Constable Corp., 58 F.T.C. 49 (1961).
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petition course focuses in on the doctrines of "misrepresentation"--when a
white lie about a product rises to the threshold of a fraud-and "diversion of
customers"--when a similarity of names is enough for "unfair competition"-
and leaves out the economic effect on consumer preferences and cdmpetition,
we are teaching that the economic and public policy concepts learned in under-
graduate study are irrelevant now that one has decided to practice law.
In this respect, the all encompasing view which Professor Alexander casts
on so many aspects of the FTC's approaches to false advertising over the past
fifty-two years acts as an indictment of "Ad Law" and "Gov Reg" professors
alike. The thrust of Dean Alexander's analysis in Honesty and Competition is
that the FTC, in exercising its statutory function of defining unfair advertising,
repeatedly ignores the extent to which the FTC may deprive the public of the
lower-priced substitutes it normally desires. An example given by Dean Alex-
ander raises a problem familiar to every man who washes his own car. It is
known that "chamois" leather will dry the most sensitive car with a maximum
of absorption and a minimum of scratch. The high price for chamois, it turns
out, is not so much an accident of short supply as it is a miracle of government
intervention to "protect the consumer." Here, the FTC has gone along with one
particular substitute for the original Alpine antelope "chamois," apparently
to the exclusion of all others. 5 The result, Dean Alexander points out, is to
keep the consumer from buying what he assumes "chamois" to be---"a cloth-like
material for washing a car that has particular properties of absorption and
softness," by granting what might be called a "label monopoly" to manufacturers
who hope to be free of competition with their products as a result. An anomalous
role for a consumer-protecting agency or just the result of failing to preserve





5. Id. at 76-79, discussing Matter of Atlantic Sponge & Chamois Corp., 52 F.T.C. 500
(1955).
